France and Morocco forge new friendship treaty

This is the sign that both nations aim to craft a document grounded in lasting strategic interests. A shared ambition to create, mutatis mutandis, an equivalent of the Franco-German Élysée Treaty signed in 1963 by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

Such a commission is not tasked with negotiating the treaty itself—that responsibility falls to the two governments—but with formulating proposals. These include the guiding principles of the partnership, strategic priorities for the 2035–2040 horizon, mechanisms for political dialogue, and the axes of economic, security, military, academic, and cultural cooperation.

That said, a first fundamental question arises: why a friendship treaty? It will replace the so-called La Celle-Saint-Cloud agreement, signed in France on 6 November 1955, which laid the foundation for Morocco’s return to independence and the end of the protectorate, officially consecrated on 2 March 1956. It was on the basis of this accord that Paris authorised the return to the throne of Mohammed V, who had been deported on 20 August 1953.

Today, the aim is undoubtedly to consolidate the achievements of a privileged, even exceptional, cooperation while laying the strategic foundations of an equal-to-equal relationship, set in the perspective of the decades to come.

Four main pillars deserve to be highlighted. The first concerns the economy: Paris’s commitment to make significant investments in Moroccan industrial sectors—automotive, rail, defence, and maritime transport—and to support their modernisation through the most advanced technologies.

As for Rabat, its commitment revolves around several axes: preferential access for French companies in major infrastructure projects, as well as tax incentives.

“This friendship treaty would bind France to a non-EU member state, whereas Algeria has never managed to finalise a similar accord in over two decades, despite several attempts under the presidencies of Jacques Chirac and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, then Emmanuel Macron and Abdelmadjid Tebboune.”

— Mustapha Sehimi

The second pillar concerns security and defence industry cooperation: transfers of military technologies intended, in the long term, to make Morocco a regional hub for the production of light and heavy equipment (aviation, munitions, military vehicles, armoured systems…), expansion of joint training programmes, and strengthened coordination in security and intelligence to meet regional security challenges, particularly in the Sahel.

The cultural field constitutes a third pillar, and not the least: maintaining the privileged position of the French language in the education system, promoting Francophonie without hindering the kingdom’s openness to an international business language like English, facilitating access for Moroccan students to French universities—they currently number more than 42,000—extending the current network of twelve French cultural institutes, and opening new schools, especially in the southern provinces.

As for the final pillar, it falls under geopolitics and strategy. What is it about? Paris’s support for Morocco’s higher interests: backing for the autonomy plan for the Sahara, validated by the Security Council within the framework of the negotiated settlement process (resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025), support within European Union institutions, and defence of Moroccan interests in sectors such as agriculture and fisheries, as well as in various bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks.

Furthermore, France hopes to be able to count on Morocco to participate, in various ways, in new strategic alliances in West Africa, where it has gradually lost influence over the past decade. The objective? To take advantage of the kingdom’s position as a regional hub.

In the end, this treaty carries major symbolic and diplomatic weight. It would bind France to a non-EU member state, whereas Algeria has never managed to finalise a similar accord in over two decades, despite several attempts under the presidencies of Jacques Chirac and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, then Emmanuel Macron and Abdelmadjid Tebboune.

Morocco now asserts itself as a regional power, an economic hub, and a leading player in energy, logistics, and security matters. This treaty could thus take on a demonstrative and exemplary dimension: that of a matrix capable of rearticulating new forms of cooperation between Europe and Africa.