Niger trapped in a cycle of endless war

Despite regime changes and dramatic geopolitical shifts, Niamey appears trapped in a war of attrition. From Mahamadou Issoufou’s Western alliance strategy to Abdourahamane Tiani’s sovereignist break, the harsh reality remains: on the ground, the terrorist threat refuses to retreat.

Three presidents, two democratic transitions, one coup d’état — and a single constant: bloodshed in the “three borders” area and the Lake Chad basin. In Niger, governments come and go, but the jihadist hydra — embodied by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) — endures.

When the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) took power in July 2023, it promised to restore security by expelling Western partners. Yet the country now faces a harsh reality check. The time has come to take stock of a war that, so far, seems unwinnable.

The Issoufou-Bazoum era: the illusion of a Western shield

Under Mahamadou Issoufou’s presidency (2011-2021), Niger positioned itself as the anchor of Western strategy in the Sahel. As neighbouring Mali’s state crumbled, Niamey became the military hub for France’s Operation Barkhane and the United States’ drone base in Agadez.

His successor, Mohamed Bazoum, tried to add a layer of political flexibility:

• A “hand extended” approach by initiating dialogue with some repentant fighters.
• Massive investment in training Nigerien special forces.

The flip side: while this strategy prevented the country’s collapse, it never managed to eliminate the threat. Worse, the presence of foreign troops fuelled deep frustration among parts of the army and population, who saw it as a loss of sovereignty for insufficient results.

Tiani’s gamble: sovereignty tested by bullets

By overthrowing Mohamed Bazoum on 26 July 2023, General Abdourahamane Tiani and the CNSP justified their power grab by citing “the continued deterioration of the security situation.” What followed is well known: a spectacular break with Paris and Washington, creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali and Burkina Faso, and a strategic rapprochement with Russia (via the Africa Corps) and Turkey.

On the communications front, the change is radical. The military leadership exalts national pride and promises a purely military response, free from Western “hidden agendas.”

The harsh ground reality

Yet reports from UN observers and strategic studies centres agree: the departure of Western forces left an immediate capability gap, particularly in aerial intelligence and technological surveillance.

Complex attacks are multiplying, sometimes targeting entire Nigerien army (FDS) garrisons and causing heavy losses. The economic blockade imposed in some regions and diplomatic isolation complicate the logistical financing of a war that costs millions of dollars per day.

Why is Niger stuck in this dead end?

The common mistake of successive regimes — whether civilian or military — lies in treating a primarily political and social crisis with a military approach. Two broad visions have broken their teeth on this:

On one side, the Issoufou-Bazoum doctrine bet everything on integration into the international security architecture. Its major weakness was excessive external dependence, disconnected from popular aspirations, making the French narrative inaudible for a large part of Nigerien public opinion.

On the other, the Tiani doctrine favours a total geopolitical rupture and martial sovereignism embodied by the AES. The limits of this formula are already visible on the ground: an immediate loss of cutting-edge technological intelligence, suffocating financial isolation, and, paradoxically, an escalation of violence by armed groups exploiting regional disorganisation.

In both cases, the root causes remain unchanged: the absence of the state in peripheral areas, lack of economic prospects for rural youth, and inter-community conflicts (especially between herders and farmers) that jihadist groups skillfully exploit for recruitment.

Whether waged to the tune of international cooperation or under the banners of AES sovereignism, the war in Niger cannot be won by arms alone. For General Tiani, the challenge is no longer just to criticise his predecessors’ record, but to prove that the current military formula can protect Nigeriens. Without a massive reintroduction of public services (schools, justice, clinics) into insecure zones, Niger risks losing this war over the long term.