On the morning of October 9, 2026, fighters from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) fought a violent battle in the Tessit area, along the border with Burkina Faso. Both organizations issued contradictory claims of victory. Yet the real question the fighting raises is far more uncomfortable: why do armed groups keep operating in the very territories the military authorities insist they are securing?
Two rival narratives, one unresolved battlefield
Sources close to JNIM say the rival organization suffered a heavy defeat on several fronts. Sources close to IS-S claim the opposite, saying JNIM was routed and that new areas were conquered. Neither account, on its own, establishes what actually happened at Tessit. What both do confirm is that armed groups are still fighting over territory in the Sahel, while civilians remain exposed to insecurity, forced displacement and the fallout of a war that shows no sign of ending.
The contradiction the juntas can no longer avoid
The Tessit clashes expose a glaring gap in the security narrative of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which are grouped in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Since taking power, these authorities have made the recovery of sovereignty and the fight against terrorism the central pillars of their legitimacy. Yet armed groups continue to move, organize and fight across the region, raising hard questions about how effective those strategies have really been.
The problem is not merely that terrorist groups exist. It is that states struggle to prevent them from putting down lasting roots on their own soil. Tessit illustrates this: while two organizations battle for positions, local populations keep enduring insecurity that persists despite repeated pledges to restore order.
AES officials regularly denounce foreign interference and, depending on the moment, accuse neighboring countries of facilitating armed group activity or providing rear bases for fighters. Such claims must be weighed against verifiable evidence. The presence of terrorist groups on a country’s territory does not by itself prove that its leaders support or knowingly host them.
Still, one question remains unavoidable: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups continue to operate in areas where the state struggles to restore lasting authority?
Sovereignty rhetoric meets the reality on the ground
A central challenge for the Sahel’s military regimes is now to show that their strategic choices are producing concrete results. Switching military partners, pushing Western forces out and drawing closer to Russia were all presented as ways to regain control of the security situation.
But these shifts alone do not eliminate armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and violence across various Sahel regions serve as a reminder that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, an effective administrative presence, protection of civilians and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territory.
A United Nations report published in 2026 described sustained activity by JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly in the Tessit and Ménaka areas of Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also noted clashes between these organizations over territorial control.
That reality undermines narratives that frame security failures as the exclusive product of outside maneuvers. Regional and cross-border factors are real, but they do not exempt any government from accountability for its own results.
The political question nobody wants to ask out loud
Managing the terrorist threat also raises a broader political issue: how do you prevent persistent insecurity from becoming a permanent excuse for concentrating power and delaying a return to normal constitutional order?
It would be reckless to assert, without evidence, that AES leaders knowingly host or nurture terrorist groups in order to stay in power. Such an accusation requires concrete, independent and verifiable proof.
It is legitimate, however, to question the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities continue to present counterterrorism as a major justification for their rule.
The distinction matters: pointing to the possible political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as claiming leaders themselves engineer that insecurity. The first is political analysis; the second demands proof.
What people in the Sahel want is results, not explanations
At Tessit, the opposing claims from JNIM and the Islamic State do not yet make it possible to determine with certainty which group came out on top on October 9. But that uncertainty does not change the core issue: these organizations can still mount operations and challenge control over certain areas.
For residents, the consequences are concrete. Insecurity disrupts travel, hampers economic activity and complicates access to essential services. Talk of sovereignty, international alliances and external enemies cannot permanently substitute for measurable results on the ground.
The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger therefore face a simple demand: demonstrate their ability to protect populations, prevent armed groups from establishing a lasting presence and restore an effective public presence in affected areas.
Sovereignty is not measured only by the partners a state chooses or the foreign forces it expels. It is also measured by a state’s capacity to protect its citizens on its own territory.
As long as armed groups continue to fight over territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer one question: beyond rhetoric and accusations aimed abroad, what lasting results can they show to guarantee the security of their people?
