On 10 October 2026, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) reportedly launched a drone attack on positions held by Africa Corps and the Malian army in Soumpi, located in the Timbuktu region. This incident brings to the forefront a critical question: after more than four years of a deepening security crisis, can Mali realistically hope to restore stability by relying primarily on its Russian military partners?
The strategic shift and its uncertain outcomes
Since assuming power, Assimi Goïta has made the realignment of military partnerships a cornerstone of his security strategy. The withdrawal of French forces and the rapprochement with Russia were presented as markers of a new sovereignty and an enhanced capacity to defend the national territory. However, the persistence of attacks and the vulnerability of certain military positions raise questions about the tangible results of this orientation.
The reported attack in Soumpi, while not sufficient on its own to draw a definitive conclusion about Russo-Malian cooperation, underscores an inescapable reality: the presence of foreign military partners does not, by itself, guarantee the end of an insurgency or the durable restoration of security.
Can Russian mercenaries truly resolve Mali’s crisis?
Assimi Goïta must confront the situation head-on: Mali’s problems will not be resolved simply by replacing a Western military partner with a Russian one. After more than four years of military rule, the population has the right to expect lasting results, not merely announcements of operations or isolated victories portrayed as decisive.
Recent events illustrate the complexity of the challenge. On 6 October 2026, the Malian army, backed by its Russian partners, reoccupied Kidal following the announced withdrawal by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). This development represents a symbolic success for Bamako, but analysts believe it does not constitute a decisive victory in the fight against armed groups.
Days later, the reported drone attack in Soumpi, in the Timbuktu region, serves as a reminder that the situation remains fragile. While the exact circumstances of this operation and its toll are yet to be established, one question persists: how can it be explained that, despite years of military cooperation with Moscow, the positions of Malian forces and their allies remain exposed to attacks?
A military cooperation that must not become dependency
The partnership with Russia may provide equipment, operational capabilities, and on-the-ground support. Yet it does not absolve Malian authorities of the need to define a coherent national strategy, strengthen their own forces, and address the root causes of insecurity.
This is precisely where the debate should focus. Has Mali sufficiently bolstered its autonomous military capabilities? Do operations enable the lasting securing of reclaimed localities? Can populations return to their villages without fear of further attacks? Can public services and administration function normally in reconquered areas?
These questions are far more important than discourses on sovereignty or rivalries between foreign powers.
War may also serve the interests of those who claim to fight it
It is also necessary to examine with lucidity the economic interests surrounding this cooperation. The presence of Russian military companies in Mali is part of a relationship where security issues and economic interests may intersect, particularly around natural resources.
However, it would be imprudent to assert, without verifiable evidence, that Russian forces deliberately seek to prolong the war for greater financial gain. Such an accusation requires documented elements on contracts, payments, and the interests at stake.
The real issue lies elsewhere: when a country’s security heavily depends on an external partner, it is essential to verify that this partner’s commitments primarily serve the interests of the Malian population. Transparency of contracts, the cost of cooperation, and the results achieved must be subject to evaluation.
A military partnership cannot be considered a success merely because it allows a government to remain in power. Its value must be measured by its capacity to protect civilians, sustainably reduce violence, and enable the country to return to normal life.
Assimi Goïta must rethink his strategy
Mali cannot afford to confuse the maintenance of power with the restoration of security. Sovereignty does not consist solely of changing partners or displaying a break with former alliances. It also entails possessing the means to defend one’s territory, protect one’s population, and make decisions without excessive dependence on a foreign power.
The Malian crisis demands a broader strategy: better-prepared national forces, effective intelligence, enhanced protection of populations, credible governance, and a political response to local conflicts. Military means are necessary, but they alone are not sufficient.
The reported attack in Soumpi should therefore be viewed as a new warning, not as definitive proof of the failure of Russian cooperation.
Ultimately, Assimi Goïta must understand one thing: Russia can be a partner for Mali, but it cannot substitute for a Malian strategy capable of producing lasting results. If the authorities continue to measure their success solely by the presence of their foreign allies, they risk missing the essential question: when will Malians finally be able to live in security, without each new attack casting doubt on promises of victory?
The priority must be Mali and its population, not the defense of any partner’s interests.
