Mali balances Russia ties with renewed US security talks

A pragmatic shift in Bamako’s alliances

For years, the story was straightforward: after pushing out French and European forces, Mali turned to Russia. Under General Assimi Goïta, Bamako made Moscow its primary security partner, welcoming Wagner fighters and later Africa Corps units, while gradually cutting ties with Western partners.

But in 2026, that narrative is starting to crack. Mali is not formally breaking with Russia. Yet signs of a rapprochement with the United States are multiplying. Intelligence cooperation, discussions about American surveillance flights, and the lifting of sanctions on senior Malian officials all point to a change of course. Mali now appears to be diversifying its alliances—and Washington has become a preferred interlocutor again.

Washington’s quiet return to the intelligence arena

The most dramatic sign of this shift concerns military intelligence.

In March 2026, reports emerged that Washington and Bamako were close to an agreement allowing the United States to resume aircraft and drone flights over Mali to monitor jihadist groups, especially JNIM, Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the Sahel. The talks followed a US decision in February to lift sanctions against Mali’s defense minister and several senior officials.

This development is far from trivial.

During the period of tension with Western powers, Bamako presented Russia as the partner capable of replacing former Western allies. Today, Malian authorities are once again willing to discuss capabilities they clearly need: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The United States had already shared intelligence with Malian authorities, some of which reportedly contributed to an operation against JNIM leaders. Washington now seeks to institutionalize this cooperation further.

The paradox is striking: Mali, which turned its back on the West to move closer to Moscow, may be rediscovering Washington’s strategic utility.

Russia’s security record: a growing embarrassment for Bamako

Why is this change happening now? Part of the answer lies in the security record of recent years.

To be precise: Wagner’s arrival in Mali does not mean that the entire security deterioration is attributable to Russia. The country was already facing a jihadist insurgency before French forces left. Armed groups have deep local roots and benefit from political, social, economic, and geographic factors that far exceed the presence of any foreign power.

But statistics reveal a reality that is hard to ignore: replacing Western partners with Russian forces has not durably curbed the violence.

The US State Department’s 2022 report indicated that terrorist activities had increased in number and lethality. That year, France completed its withdrawal from Mali, with the last French soldier leaving on August 15, 2022. Meanwhile, Malian forces, backed by Wagner, took over former French positions. The State Department called 2022 the deadliest year in Mali’s history in terms of terrorist violence and counterterrorism operations.

The following year did not reverse the trend.

According to the 2023 US terrorism report, terrorist activities increased further in number and intensity. The document described 2023 as the deadliest year in Mali’s history, considering both terrorist attacks and operations by Malian forces with Wagner.

The finding is particularly embarrassing for the narrative that presented the Russian partnership as the solution to Mali’s security problem.

From Wagner to Africa Corps: Moscow has not disappeared

It would be premature, however, to announce Russia’s departure.

Wagner has been gradually replaced by Africa Corps, directly linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense. Moscow therefore retains a significant military and political presence in Mali.

But this presence is also experiencing setbacks.

In April 2026, an offensive by JNIM and Tuareg fighters inflicted serious reverses on Malian forces and their Russian allies. Mali’s defense minister, Sadio Camara, trained in Russia, was killed in an attack. Africa Corps also had to withdraw from Kidal, a strategic northern town it had helped retake in 2023.

Reports at the time indicated that these setbacks had severely damaged Russia’s image as a guarantor of security in Mali. ACLED analyst Héni Nsaibia even suggested that JNIM’s successive campaigns, the fuel blockade, and recent events illustrated the failure of the Russian intervention.

This is, of course, an analysis, not a universal verdict. But it highlights a problem that has become difficult to ignore: Moscow has not succeeded in ending the insurgency.

Security still under pressure

Data available in 2025 reinforces this question.

According to ACLED figures cited by Reuters, Malian forces and Russian paramilitary groups Wagner and Africa Corps reportedly killed 918 civilians in Mali in 2025, compared to 232 attributed to JNIM and Islamic State in the Sahel. These figures cover documented deaths and should therefore be interpreted with caution. They nonetheless reflect the scale of violence and the accusations against government forces and their Russian allies.

At the same time, jihadists have continued to advance. JNIM has notably managed to disrupt the country’s supply routes and impose considerable pressure on Bamako.

In March 2026, Malian authorities even released around 200 people detained for alleged links to jihadists as part of an arrangement to secure a truce on attacks on fuel convoys, according to Le Monde.

For a junta that came to power promising to restore sovereignty and security, the symbolism is heavy.

Mali may no longer be choosing between Moscow and Washington

It would still be too early to speak of a rupture with Russia.

Moscow retains considerable interests in Mali, particularly in gold, lithium, and energy. Russia has supported mining and energy projects and continues to affirm its commitment alongside Bamako.

Mali’s strategy seems to be evolving toward a pragmatic logic: no longer depending on a single partner.

After making Moscow its main security recourse following the French departure, Bamako now appears to recognize that Russia alone cannot meet all its military and intelligence needs.

That is where the United States re-enters the picture.

Washington offers what Moscow does not necessarily provide under the same conditions: aerial and satellite intelligence capabilities, considerable technological means, and deep knowledge of jihadist networks.

The rapprochement with America may therefore be less an ideological conversion than a pragmatic observation: Mali needs multiple partners to confront a threat that its alliance with Russia has failed to eliminate.

From Western rupture to pragmatism

Mali’s recent history is thus undergoing another reversal.

Yesterday, Bamako denounced the French and European presence and presented Russia as the sovereign alternative. Today, talks with Washington are resuming at a level that would have seemed improbable just a few years ago.

Russia remains in Mali. But its security record is contested, its forces are facing setbacks, and jihadists continue to threaten the country.

In this context, the US-Mali rapprochement appears as much more than a simple diplomatic episode. It could mark the beginning of a new foreign policy for Bamako: no longer replacing one partner with another, but using rivalry between great powers to obtain what Mali needs from each.

Mali has not yet abandoned Russia. But one thing is now clear: Russia’s monopoly on Mali’s security partnership may already be a thing of the past.

By Pierre Tchuente — Analyste Sécutié et polique