The Sahel’s dilemma: should negotiations with jihadist groups be an option?

Following the coordinated assaults on April 25 and 26 targeting Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal, a previously unspoken question has re-emerged in Malian security discussions: should dialogue be initiated with jihadist factions? Given the extensive scale of the offensive, jointly executed by Jnim (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), an Al-Qaïda affiliate, and the Tuareg insurgents of the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA), numerous analysts and specialists now contend that a purely military approach is proving insufficient.

Across Mali, from its northern reaches to its southern territories, the offensive has spread with unprecedented rapidity. Armed factions launched a barrage of coordinated attacks against military forces and government symbols in a minimum of six urban centers, reaching as far as the outskirts of Bamako. This marked the first time Jnim and the FLA visibly collaborated on such a scale. Established in November 2024 following the dissolution of the Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP), the FLA advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a vast northern Malian region.

These assaults starkly revealed the Malian regime’s fragility. Neither Assimi Goïta’s junta nor its Russian partners from Africa Corps appear capable of stemming the advance of these armed organizations. Regional media outlets and diplomatic circles are now increasingly discussing the possibility of negotiations with Jnim, against a backdrop of Bamako’s gradual isolation and regional instability. However, the junta publicly dismisses any notion of talks. Bamako insists it rules out « any dialogue with armed terrorist groups, » adhering to a rigid military stance despite the rapidly worsening security landscape.

Since late April, pressure on the regime has consistently escalated. Violence is rampant in the central parts of the country. Just last Friday, several villages in the Bankass region, including Kouroude and Dougara, came under attack. Local and security intelligence indicates that the combined death toll from Wednesday’s and Friday’s assaults ranges from 70 to 80 fatalities.

An unprecedented alliance, a warning signal

Jnim continues to be the primary force driving jihadist activity across the Sahel, particularly in Mali, but also extending its influence into Burkina Faso and Niger. For the military juntas forming the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), the situation is becoming increasingly dire. Despite coming to power with pledges to restore security, they struggle to contain a constantly expanding threat. In Mali, for nearly a year, attacks have been drawing relentlessly closer to the capital.

« Starting in July 2025, jihadists initiated assaults in western Mali, targeting gold mining and industrial sites. Subsequently, they focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, effectively isolating the capital, » notes Alain Antil, director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Center at Ifri. « What is striking this time is not merely the scale of the operation, but also the deliberate selection of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the regime’s core, » observes Héni Nsaibia of Acled.

The demise of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati sent profound shockwaves through the government. Concurrently, the recapture of Kidal in late 2023, initially hailed as a significant triumph, now represents a critical strategic setback.

The strategy of strangulation

Even before this latest offensive, several specialists had noted a shift in Jnim’s strategy. « There is an observable intent to establish a more dominant power dynamic, not solely through security pressure, but also to compel Malian authorities into negotiations, » Alain Antil had previously explained.

The jihadist group now aims to replicate nationally what it had been testing locally: economic blockades, gradual encirclement of urban centers, and pressure on vital logistical routes. « Jnim is attempting to sustain an economic blockade around Bamako, » the researcher emphasizes.

According to Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, this strategy is a long-term play: « They have opted to weaken the government from within, favoring a strategy of attrition and exploiting vulnerabilities within the military system. » He further states: « Jnim no longer presents the implementation of Sharia law as a prerequisite for peace and now expresses openness to negotiation. »

Within this volatile environment, the ongoing rivalry with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) introduces another layer of instability, as both factions strive to expand their territorial control and influence.

A once-taboo option gains traction

Officially, Sahelian governments reject any notion of dialogue. « For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is not on the table. The rhetoric remains militaristic, with a military response as the sole perceived option, » observes Alain Antil.

However, the reality on the ground is considerably more intricate. Atrocities committed by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed by government forces and their Russian partners in Mali, a figure almost five times higher than those attributed to Jnim, according to the GI-TOC. Such violence fuels resentment and inadvertently aids jihadist recruitment efforts.

States must commit to a brave compromise.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel researcher

Confronted with this stalemate, an increasing number of experts advocate for a paradigm shift. « A military-only approach is a dead end when dealing with the jihadist phenomenon in the Sahel. It must be paired with political negotiations, » asserts Alain Antil of Ifri. Certain grievances articulated by jihadist groups – such as corruption, justice, and resource access – could potentially serve as a foundation for discussions, without overlooking their inherent violence.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa extends this argument further: « States need to embrace a brave compromise. The concept would be to integrate jihadists into the political arena to expose their limitations. » However, he establishes clear red lines: « The principle of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable. »

As jihadist offensives advance, the notion of negotiation is increasingly transforming from a heresy into a viable political proposition. For many specialists in Mali, the core question is no longer whether dialogue is necessary, but rather how much longer Bamako can continue to resist it.