Niger’s defining moment: why this coup reshapes the sahel’s future

The military takeover in Niger, orchestrated by General Abdourahamane Tiani on July 26, which unseated President Mohamed Bazoum, marks a significant escalation in the Sahel’s troubling trend of unconstitutional changes. Since 2020, the Sahelian belt has witnessed six coups; Niger’s adds a seventh to this concerning tally. The global community’s and regional bodies’ responses have been remarkably intense, yet simultaneously fractured and ambiguous, unlike prior instances. This particular coup carries profound international implications and potentially greater perils than its predecessors. We may very well be experiencing a critical juncture for security paradigms, governance structures, multilateral cooperation, and international diplomacy across Africa. Here, we delve into three primary arguments illustrating why this coup deviates from earlier Sahelian power grabs and holds immense, critical importance.

1. A complex tapestry: no single explanation for the coup

The precise motivations behind the July 26 coup against President Bazoum in Niamey remain a subject of intense debate among observers, policy analysts, and Nigeriens themselves, even within elite circles.

While coup dynamics are inherently intricate, the factors driving recent coups in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso since 2020 were relatively more discernible. In August 2020, Malian military officers leveraged widespread public discontent and protests against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s perceived corrupt governance. They positioned themselves as popular saviors, restoring order and embodying the public’s will. Later, when civilian transitional authorities attempted to reconfigure the government at the military’s expense, the armed forces asserted their dominance in what was termed the ‘coup within the coup’ in May 2021. Similarly, Burkina Faso’s coups in January and September 2022 stemmed from strained civil-military relations and internal friction within the security forces, exacerbated by severe military setbacks against jihadist groups. Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba deposed President Christian Kaboré, only to be overthrown months later by Captain Ibrahim Traoré following devastating losses to jihadist militants in Inata (November 2021) and Djibo (September 2022).

In stark contrast, the coup against President Bazoum was not preceded by widespread street protests in Niamey, nor did it follow significant military defeats against jihadist movements. Although President Bazoum’s legitimacy from the 2021 general elections faced accusations of fraud, these claims never coalesced into a political force strong enough to genuinely threaten his tenure. Furthermore, unlike his predecessor Mamadou Issoufou’s administration, which was plagued by corruption scandals, Bazoum’s term was largely free from such allegations. On the security front, the situation had shown objective improvement since his election.

To date, a comprehensive and singular explanation for the Niger coup remains elusive. It appears to be the result of an uncontrolled series of escalating events. The initial catalyst was General Tiani, commander of the Presidential Guard, ostensibly responsible for Bazoum’s protection. Tiani was widely perceived as Mamadou Issoufou’s loyalist within the presidential palace. Both Tiani and Issoufou may have harbored personal or business-related grievances against some of Bazoum’s recent policy decisions. What evolved into an undeniable coup potentially began as an elite-level power struggle over arrangements inherited from the Issoufou era. This internal friction then presented an opportunity for other officers, historically opposed to Issoufou and Bazoum’s political party, to join forces and subvert the sitting president. This move sparked internal military discussions, leading to the formation of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) within hours, with Tiani at its helm. This foundational, yet fragile, agreement among military factions was swiftly followed by appeals for popular support and strategic administrative appointments to solidify the fait accompli. As of now, President Bazoum, his wife, and son remain detained under Tiani’s forces. Power dynamics within the military leadership appear fluid, as various interest groups now jockey for position around the new military leader, whose long-term vision for the nation remains notably vague and poorly articulated.

2. The specter of military intervention looms

In an unprecedented move, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional bloc, issued a seven-day ultimatum demanding the restoration of constitutional order, explicitly backed by the threat of military force against the putschists. This assertive approach sharply contrasts with ECOWAS’s handling of previous coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, which typically involved a more conventional script of sanctions and negotiated transitions.

ECOWAS’s altered course of action appears to be driven by several factors. Firstly, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, recently installed as ECOWAS chairman, campaigned on a platform of ‘stopping the coups’ across West Africa. The seemingly infectious spread of authoritarian governance in the Sahel challenges and undermines ECOWAS’s foundational principles of civilian rule. Thus, Tinubu’s own credibility, alongside that of ECOWAS, in swiftly reinstating constitutional order, was severely tested.

Secondly, given the coup’s tentative initial phases, which suggested both poor planning and internal divisions within Nigerien security forces, ECOWAS likely sought to swiftly contain the crisis, aiming to prevent another protracted transitional scenario akin to those in neighboring states.

However, the military threat inadvertently backfired. The Nigerien junta outright refused to engage with ECOWAS envoys during the ultimatum week. Instead, they galvanized both domestic support against ‘external aggression’ and regional backing from fellow coup leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, thereby elevating the stakes to a potential regional conflict. While ECOWAS’s ultimatum drew global attention and underscored a clear stance against coups, it also inadvertently strengthened the junta’s position, fueled by a powerful nationalist sovereignty narrative. In the week preceding the ultimatum’s expiration, the junta and its influential social media channels cultivated an intense atmosphere, propagating claims of imminent aggression by ECOWAS, allegedly orchestrated by France. 

The possibility of war has deepened divisions among ECOWAS member states, placing the regional bloc in a precarious dilemma. Military intervention faces opposition not only from Nigeriens but also from significant segments of public opinion in potential troop-contributing countries, particularly in Nigeria. A military conflict would almost certainly exacerbate the humanitarian, security, and political crises in the region, potentially empowering jihadist insurgents who have already launched multiple deadly attacks since the coup. Yet, ECOWAS is now constrained by its own strong rhetoric and risks losing credibility if it fails to act as negotiations repeatedly falter. Time clearly favors the putschists: a ‘transition’ is not a concession they would make to the international community, but rather their tested and approved strategy, following the model of their Malian and Burkinabè counterparts, who gained power through such a framework with minimal accountability.

3. Elevated international stakes

On a regional scale, ECOWAS’s threat of military force has provoked strong resistance from its suspended members, not only raising the specter of a regional war but also threatening the very integrity of the organization itself. The prospect of conflict has not just destabilized ECOWAS members; it has also triggered robust and polarized international reactions. The previous diplomatic alignment, where ECOWAS spearheaded conflict resolution efforts with France as the primary external actor, no longer holds. At the continental level, a divided African Union took over a week to issue a joint statement, merely supporting ECOWAS’s endeavors and ‘taking note’ of the standby force deployment.

Beyond the African continent, France and the United States, two pivotal international players in the region, have adopted markedly different approaches to navigate this crisis. France adopted a firm stance from the outset, condemning the coup, evacuating its citizens, and openly endorsing a potential ECOWAS military intervention while advocating for President Bazoum’s release and reinstatement. This position was swiftly penalized by the junta, which suspended all military cooperation with France.

Conversely, the US has engaged in unprecedented diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis, dispatching a high-ranking US official for direct negotiations with the junta and explicitly rejecting the use of force as a viable solution. While advocating for President Bazoum’s liberation, the US has cautiously avoided officially labeling the event as a ‘coup’. This strategic linguistic choice aims to circumvent legal obligations that would necessitate an immediate cessation of military collaboration. The US has openly expressed its desire to maintain military ties, especially given its investment in one of the continent’s largest drone bases in Agadez. The previously unthinkable scenario where US troops remain in Niger (potentially alongside other European forces already present), while French troops are compelled to withdraw, is now a tangible possibility. Such an outcome could significantly strain bilateral relations between France and the US. For France, increasingly viewed as a challenging ally by its Western partners, this could signify a humiliating conclusion to a decade-long military engagement in the Sahel and a severe blow to its aspirations for international influence, as Niger was intended to be the testing ground for a revitalized security partnership in the Sahel, built on lessons learned from its abrupt and contentious exit from Mali.

Conclusion

“In Niger, a coup is not a surprise, but a statistical probability,” as Rahmane Idrissa aptly noted, highlighting that this marks the country’s fifth coup and thus, to some extent, a continuation of a well-established structural civil-military imbalance. Nevertheless, this particular coup distinguishes itself from previous ones in Niger, some of which were seen as ‘corrective’ and even pro-democratic. It also differs from other recent Sahelian coups precisely because it lacks a clear, widely accepted justification. If the coup’s origins are rooted in diverse and ambiguous rationales, the responses from various actors have mirrored this divergence and confusion. Each party has adopted an approach heavily influenced by its national interests, rather than adhering to established norms or agreements among partners. This fractured international and regional response, combined with lessons learned from neighboring states, has empowered the junta to disregard negotiation attempts and solidify its position, capitalizing on internal, regional, and international divisions. Consequently, it appears highly probable that this coup — truly ‘one coup too many’ — has profoundly shattered hopes for a return to constitutional order and democracy in the region, simultaneously dismantling much of the remaining regional and continental cohesion.

Yvan Guichaoua (@YGuichaoua) is a Senior Lecturer in International Conflict Analysis at the Brussels School of International Studies, specializing in Sahelian security and politics since 2007.

Nina Wilén (@WilenNina) serves as Director of the Africa Program at the Egmont Institute & Associate Professor of Political Science at Lund University, conducting research on military interventions in Africa with a specific focus on the Sahel and the Great Lakes regions.