Ten months after Umaro Sissoco Embaló was removed from office by the military, the former president is preparing an attempted comeback. From exile, he has declared he will run in the presidential election on 6 December 2026. His announcement is both a symbolic statement and a direct political challenge — and it raises two questions that now overshadow the vote itself: can he legally stand, and will the result ever be published?
A bid to re-enter the race less than a year after being ousted
Embaló, who was toppled in a military coup on 26 November 2025, has confirmed he intends to return to Guinea-Bissau and seek the presidency again. His homecoming is expected on 4 October. In making that decision, he is choosing to re-enter the electoral arena less than twelve months after losing power.
“I will be a candidate,” he said. The 6 December vote is officially meant to close the military transition and restore an elected civilian government. Yet behind that electoral timetable lies a far more delicate issue: under what conditions can Embaló realistically compete, and what role will he occupy in a political landscape that has been profoundly reshaped since his removal?
The coup that followed a contested presidential election
To understand the significance of his candidacy, it is necessary to go back to 26 November 2025. Three days earlier, voters had gone to the polls in a fiercely disputed presidential and legislative election. Embaló, standing for a second term, and his main rival, Fernando Dias, both claimed victory.
On 26 November, as the electoral commission was due to publish preliminary results the following day, soldiers seized control of state institutions. Embaló was arrested and the electoral process suspended. General Horta N’Tam, then chief of staff and a close ally of Embaló, was subsequently installed as transitional president.
The junta justified its intervention by citing the need to preserve national security and to prevent an alleged destabilisation plot involving, it claimed, figures linked to drug trafficking. No public evidence has independently substantiated that accusation.
The coup also destroyed the electoral process. The electoral commission said ballot records, computers and servers containing voting data were seized or destroyed. As a result, it is impossible today to know officially the outcome of the November 2025 presidential election.
That missing result still fuels controversy. Embaló’s opponents have accused him of orchestrating or facilitating the putsch himself in order to block the release of figures that would have gone against him. Several observers have floated the hypothesis, but it has never been established as fact. The close relationship between Embaló and General Horta N’Tam has nonetheless fed suspicion.
A return to a political system that has been transformed
In ten months, Guinea-Bissau has changed significantly. On 30 August 2026, the junta held a constitutional referendum that approved, according to provisional results, a new constitution substantially expanding presidential powers. Under the new text, the president can appoint and dismiss the prime minister and government and, in certain circumstances, dissolve parliament.
The reform came just months before the presidential election. The opposition, in particular the PAIGC, had called for a boycott of the referendum, denouncing a process held under military control. The vote was nevertheless declared approved with around 70 percent of ballots cast.
Another element potentially decisive for Embaló: the new constitution requires presidential candidates to have resided continuously in the country for the five years preceding the election. It also introduces a deposit of 50 million CFA francs. These new rules could therefore become a major obstacle for the former president, who has been in exile since his removal.
Can Embaló actually reclaim power?
The central question is now less about his return than about his ability to convert it into an electoral victory. Several factors pull in different directions.
On one hand, Embaló retains important political networks. His former party, Madem G15, remains a presence in the political landscape, while several figures from his entourage continued to hold responsibilities during the transition. The military leadership itself is headed by a former close associate, even though the junta now says it is conducting an independent transition.
On the other, his image is deeply contested. His opponents accuse him of having weakened democratic institutions during his term and of governing amid repeated tensions with parliament and the opposition. Even before the 2025 coup, the country had already experienced several political and military crises.
Crucially, one essential indicator is missing: the result of the November 2025 presidential election. With no official result published, it is impossible to say whether Embaló held a majority at the time or, conversely, was on course to lose. The conflicting victory claims made at the time by Embaló and Fernando Dias do not amount to a reliable electoral measurement.
The only certainty is that Embaló’s announced return opens a new phase of uncertainty. Its success will depend in particular on his eligibility under the new constitutional rules, on how the vote is actually organised, on the opposition’s ability to regroup and on the army’s stance.
December 6 could therefore become a decisive moment for Guinea-Bissau. But before knowing whether Umaro Sissoco Embaló can reclaim the presidency, a more fundamental question remains: will the country this time manage to hold an election whose results are actually published and accepted by all political actors?
After decades of coups, institutional crises and disputed ballots, that is probably where the true significance of the December vote will be decided.
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