The General Population and Housing Census (RGPH 2024) has uncovered sweeping demographic shifts in Morocco over the past decade. Urban peripheries are expanding rapidly, historic downtowns are shrinking, and rural areas remain relatively stagnant. These changes directly impact the fairness of the 2026 legislative elections.

Unprecedented voter-to-representative disparities revealed

Analysis of the electoral map—calculating the number of eligible voters per parliamentary seat—exposes dramatic inconsistencies. Morocco’s electoral system operates under two guiding principles:

• Demographic proportionality: Seats must reflect population size.
• Territorial equity: Each province must have at least two seats to prevent marginalization of less densely populated or remote areas.

This minimum representation rule creates stark contrasts. In some southern provinces, the voter-to-seat ratio remains extremely low:

• Aousserd: 2,992 eligible voters per seat
• Tarfaya: 5,368 eligible voters per seat
• Assa-Zag: 10,178 eligible voters per seat
• Es-Semara: 19,712 eligible voters per seat
• Boujdour: 20,185 eligible voters per seat

Meanwhile, major urban centers and their outskirts face the opposite challenge:

• Tanger-Assilah: 213,980 eligible voters per seat
• Marrakech-Ménara: 176,256 eligible voters per seat
• Casablanca-Sidi Bernoussi: 174,501 eligible voters per seat
• Nouaceur (Casablanca periphery): 155,172 eligible voters per seat
• Inezgane-Aït Melloul: 151,978 eligible voters per seat

A ballot cast in Aousserd or Tarfaya carries far more weight in electing a deputy than one cast in Tanger or Marrakech.

Urban-rural asymmetry and the rise of expanding peripheries

RGPH 2024 data confirms Morocco’s rapid urbanization: of the country’s 36.8 million residents, 23.1 million live in cities—an increase of 2.68 million in a decade—while rural populations grew by just 302,419, reaching 13.7 million. 71.2% of Moroccans now reside in just five regions: Grand Casablanca-Settat, Rabat-Salé-Kénitra, Marrakech-Safi, Fès-Meknès, and Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma.

The most striking trend is the exodus from historic city centers to peripheral districts. Casablanca-Anfa lost a quarter of its population in a decade, dropping from 453,000 to 332,000 residents, yet retains four seats—a ratio of 68,707 eligible voters per seat. In contrast, Nouaceur’s population doubled to 665,000 but holds only three seats, yielding a ratio of 155,172 eligible voters per seat.

Similar imbalances appear in Rabat: while Rabat-Océan and Rabat-Chellah have ratios of 55,856 and 59,598 eligible voters per seat, respectively, their growing periphery Skhirat-Témara has a ratio of 141,832.

Political stakes of potential electoral boundary adjustments

Redrawing electoral maps to align with 2024 census data presents complex political decisions ahead of the 2026 elections. If authorities rebalance seats without increasing the total number of deputies, they must redistribute seats from declining urban centers (like Casablanca-Anfa) to growing peripheries (like Nouaceur or Skhirat-Témara).

Fewer seats per constituency intensify electoral competition, favoring established parties with robust financial resources and mobilization networks—such as the current coalition parties RNI, PAM, and Istiqlal. Conversely, more seats per constituency lower the threshold for parliamentary entry via the “largest remainder” system, benefiting smaller parties.

Rural anchoring and voter participation distortions

Despite urban growth, many city-dwellers remain registered to vote in their rural hometowns to maintain local influence. This explains persistently high rural turnout—sometimes exceeding 90%—contrasting with urban abstention rates of 70-80% in middle-class districts.

Ongoing voter registration drives aim to update records for citizens who have moved from urban centers to fast-growing peripheries, correct inaccuracies, and improve the electoral roll’s reliability ahead of the September 23, 2026 elections.

Preparing for the 2026 elections: challenges for urban middle-class mobilization

Beyond technical redistricting, these demographic shifts pose strategic challenges for the upcoming elections. The urban middle class—hard-hit by inflation and feeling excluded from recent targeted social aid reforms—largely abstained in 2021. Their potential return to polling stations in 2026, whether through protest voting or support for alternative platforms, could reshape political balances.

• Urban middle-class remobilization: A significant turnout could alter current political equilibria.
• Strategic positioning of political forces: Majority coalition parties must defend their economic and social records in a post-inflation context, while opposition groups like the PJD seek to capitalize on urban discontent and rekindle their base among disillusioned local activists.

Ultimately, reconciling 2024 census realities with territorial equity will require precision from policymakers. Though no official electoral boundary revisions have been announced, the new population data has set the stage for an inevitable technical and political debate ahead of the 2026 legislative elections.