Military juntas in the Sahel suppress former allies after seizing power

The closing days of January 2026 marked the definitive end of multi-party politics in Burkina Faso. On January 29, Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s government officially banned all political parties, including those that had backed his September 2022 coup.

Although these organizations had already been temporarily barred after Traoré took control, the junta framed the sweeping dissolution as part of a broader “state restructuring” aimed at easing social tensions.

In reality, the move eliminates the last remnants of independent civic engagement and centralizes power even further under Traoré. Party assets have since been confiscated by the state.

While the junta initially enjoyed strong grassroots support, this sweeping ban contradicts its earlier rhetoric of popular mobilization and revolutionary renewal. Yet this outcome is hardly unexpected.

Across the Sahel and beyond, military backers discover that early enthusiasm rarely translates into lasting political influence. Coups that begin with broad public backing often end with the junta sidelining or openly repressing the very groups that helped cement its rule—a pattern documented for decades.

After nearly ten years of studying military takeovers—especially the recent surge in West African coups—it is clear that junta leaders have little incentive to share authority once in power. Civilian allies supply crowds, legitimacy, and the appearance of a popular mandate, but their utility fades quickly.

These groups arrive with their own leaders, constituencies, and expectations for the transition. They may criticize delays or mobilize supporters—precisely the independence that military rulers fear. Early public backing should never be mistaken for a durable mandate or a promise of an inclusive transition.

The recent party ban in Burkina Faso is the latest reminder: outside support can help trigger or stabilize a coup, yet it rarely secures long-term influence.

Why early civilian backing rarely survives the transition

Contrary to popular belief, many coups in Africa attract at least some civilian support. Sometimes local groups actively encourage the takeover; other times they help stabilize it. This dynamic has been especially visible during the recent wave of Sahel coups. From Mali to Niger, military interventions were welcomed, celebrated, and even endorsed by civil society, opposition parties, and other domestic actors. For coup leaders, such alliances provide instant legitimacy and a ready-made support base.

Yet a familiar pattern follows. As civilian groups push to remain influential in the post-coup order, juntas routinely squeeze them out, marginalize them, or crack down outright. This playbook spans generations and ideologies, transcending regional divides.

Echoes of past betrayals

In Sudan, for example, the Communist Party initially aligned with Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri’s Free Officers in the 1969 coup, offering crucial political backing. Within seven months, Nimeiri began removing communist officials. By 1971 he had turned violently against the party, crushing it in a brutal crackdown.

A similar fate unfolded in Egypt after the 2013 takeover. The Tamarod protest movement openly endorsed General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s power grab, only to see its influence evaporate as civic space shrank and the military consolidated control.

Sahel activists learn the same hard lesson

Today, many of the civil-society coalitions that championed recent Sahel coups are experiencing the same reversal.

In Mali, the June 5 Movement–Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5–RFP)—a broad coalition of opposition parties, religious leaders, and activists linked to imam Mahmoud Dicko—once hailed the August 2020 army intervention that ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The movement expected to shape the transition, yet the junta quickly sidelined its leaders when forming the interim government.

The dynamic worsened after Colonel Assimi Goïta staged a second coup in May 2021, toppling the civilian transitional administration and tightening military control. What had begun as a tactical alliance ended with the M5–RFP’s marginalization.

Guinea’s 2021 coup followed an almost identical script. Opposition figures initially cheered General Mamady Doumbouya’s takeover, even urging the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to withhold sanctions and legitimize the putsch as a necessary corrective.

As in Mali, the junta rapidly froze out civilian allies. Within a year, party leaders were jailed for criticizing their exclusion from the transition.

Viewed alongside Burkina Faso’s recent party ban, these cases confirm a clear pattern: early civilian support may spark a coup, but it rarely guarantees continued access or influence once the junta has entrenched itself.