Over the past few weeks, the number of initiatives aimed at re-establishing dialogue and consultation between ECOWAS member states and the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) has grown rapidly. At the core of these delicate efforts lies the security question and the pressing need to adopt common policies that can, as much as possible, harmonise actions while working toward the sacred goal of pooling resources. To give this emergency diplomacy every chance of success, the parties involved must respect certain tacit requirements: sidestepping the dispute over the three Sahel countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS, setting aside the resentments stirred by hostile communication campaigns from the Sahel regimes against some regional neighbours, and moving beyond the geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel that has, among other effects, created a “cold war” climate between the two blocs. In short, it means burying old grudges, overcoming tensions and inappropriate displays of pride, and focusing on the common challenges of the moment.

Côte d’Ivoire “ready to resume cooperation”

One strong signal of this shift came from recent statements by Côte d’Ivoire’s defence minister, Téné Birahima Ouattara. On 15 June, he declared himself “sincerely ready to resume security cooperation” with Mali and Burkina Faso, arguing that “terrorism, as it currently presents itself, cannot be defeated by a single state. There must be collaboration, a pooling of forces.” This obvious truth bears repeating at a time when some decision-makers warn that the consequences of the Sahel security crisis “could become untenable in the medium term” for the entire region.

How will Mali and Burkina Faso respond to Côte d’Ivoire’s call? For now, nothing suggests a collective surge of lucidity from all the actors involved to jointly produce solutions to the pressing emergencies. Even if the leaders of Mali and Burkina Faso acknowledge that the break with ECOWAS “does not exclude bilateral cooperation,” it remains difficult for them to suddenly change their stance toward their Ivorian counterpart. Côte d’Ivoire is regularly accused of harbouring terrorist elements “financed” or “sponsored” by French imperialism — making it a prime target in the Sahel Alliance’s narrative of external, even imaginary, enemies. Though these accusations have never been backed by facts or evidence, they are part of the doctrinal storytelling of regimes born from the coups that led to their withdrawal from ECOWAS. Yet, despite these strained diplomatic relations, Côte d’Ivoire maintains discreet channels of exchange and cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, whose nationals enjoy refugee status in Ivorian territory by the thousands.

“New era” for Bénin and Niger

Bénin, also targeted by these same accusations, has seen its new president, Romuald Wadagni, shortly after his inauguration on 24 May, take steps toward rapprochement and appeasement with the Sahel Alliance states. Special attention is given to Niger, whose shared border with Bénin has remained closed since the aftermath of the July 2023 coup in Niamey. When all dialogue between the two countries had become impossible, the arrival of a new leader in Bénin provided an opportunity to end what had turned into a vulgar personal quarrel between Nigerien military authorities and former Bénin president Patrice Talon.

The change at the helm of Bénin’s presidency has thus acted as a catalyst for “reconciliation” between these two neighbours. To this end, a “meeting of experts” from Niger and Bénin was held in Cotonou on 20 and 21 June to draft the terms of a new cooperation, focusing mainly on defence, security, and conditions for reopening the shared border — a decisive factor for resuming economic activity between the two countries. On this last point, the Nigerien delegation emphasised its wish to obtain more information about the alleged presence of “foreign elements” at the Bénin-Niger border. This request echoes the persistent suspicion of Niamey’s military authorities that Bénin is hosting a “French military base” intended to “destabilise Niger” or “finance terrorism.” Yet this accusation defies common sense: why would Bénin “finance” terrorism when it is itself a target and victim of it? Such statements have become routine narrative for the Sahel Alliance regimes, which are struggling to slow the continuous deterioration of the security situation on their own territories. Their promise to unite military resources to combat terrorism has not gone beyond rhetoric. Today, large swaths of Nigerien, Malian and Burkinabe territory have become grey zones administered by armed terrorist groups, whose expansion and formidable project the ruling juntas cannot contain.

The time has therefore come for reconciliation between Niger and Bénin. According to Niger’s interior and security minister, Mohamed Toumba, “a new era is opening” for the two countries. He added, “By choosing dialogue rather than confrontation, we have created value for our economies and security for our populations.” Nigerien and Bénin actors are fully aware that behind the security challenge lies the equally crucial economic one, in a space where populations share intertwined destinies. As we witness a return to realistic and pragmatic diplomacy, what is unfolding between Bénin and Niger resembles a textbook case or a pilot event for a reassessed, intelligent management of shared vulnerabilities across the common West African space.

Endogenous responses to the security crisis

Initiatives aimed at “normalising” relations between ECOWAS and the Sahel Alliance states are expected to become even more concrete in the coming months. Besides reactivating the neighbourhood logic that has prevailed for decades in this region, they highlight the urgency of endogenous answers to the security equation. This echoes recommendations made last year by the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, for “a resumption of dialogue among all West African countries.” In December 2025, Russia — a privileged partner of the Sahel Alliance states — sent the first signals of a diplomatic recalibration in West Africa by calling for “continued pragmatic and mutually beneficial dialogue between ECOWAS and the AES to find common solutions to counter shared challenges and threats, including the fight against regional terrorism.” These remarks indicate a paradigm shift in international cooperation — a way, after all, of reminding Africans that it is up to them alone to craft the most efficient solutions to their current challenges.

Already, bilateral relational protocols are being observed between the AES and some countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Togo and Senegal. Despite their withdrawal from ECOWAS, the Sahel military regimes have maintained their presence within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and their nationals continue to benefit from the principle of free movement within the ECOWAS space. In the end, one must question the wisdom of the AES promoters’ exit from the regional community. The only available answer points back to the original dispute: ECOWAS’s condemnation of the coups that occurred in the AES countries and, above all, the refusal of these regime leaders to work toward a “restoration of constitutional order.” In many respects, the rupture between the AES and ECOWAS resembles an artificial or unfinished divorce.