The Sahel’s strategic alliance: why concrete action remains elusive for the AES

A year has passed since the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, formalized its charter and established its confederation. Yet, questions frequently arise regarding its capacity to fulfill its central pledge: mutual defense. In the wake of recent security escalations and significant jihadist assaults impacting Nigerien territory, the noticeable absence of a joint armed intervention has prompted concerns among local populations and regional observers alike. Several inherent structural and strategic factors contribute to this operational inertia on the ground in Niger.

Overburdened national armies

A primary constraint impeding the AES’s collective action is the strained capacity of its member states’ national armed forces. Each nation within the alliance grapples with intense security threats within its own borders:

• In Mali: The Malian army and its allies remain acutely focused on maintaining control over the northern and central regions, confronting the Permanent Strategic Framework and groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda.
• In Burkina Faso: More than half of the national territory endures persistent pressure from ongoing terrorist attacks.
• In Niger: Nigerien forces are simultaneously tasked with securing the volatile tri-border region (Liptako-Gourma) against the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), while also monitoring the critical Lake Chad basin.

Within this demanding context, none of the three states possesses sufficient strategic reserves to project a substantial contingent into a neighboring country without critically weakening its own national defense apparatus. This highlights a significant challenge for West Africa Sahel security.

Logistical hurdles for a joint force

Despite the political decision to unify forces, affirmed during AES Confederation summits, the practical implementation of such a joint force encounters considerable material obstacles:

• Interoperability and command: Harmonizing disparate military doctrines and establishing a fully integrated command structure demands considerable time and robust, secure transmission networks.
• Air support and intelligence: Projecting troops over vast distances across the Sahel requires extensive armored transport, resupply capabilities, and crucial aerial intelligence assets such as drones and combat aviation. These capacities are currently limited and heavily utilized locally, presenting a major bottleneck for any Mali Niger Burkina news English reader following regional developments.

The evolving role of external partners

The departure of traditional military forces, notably France and the UN mission MINUSMA, prompted the three military regimes to pivot their partnerships towards Russia, specifically through the deployment of the paramilitary Africa Corps. However, these support forces are primarily deployed under bilateral agreements and are not principally mandated to conduct cross-border operations under the AES banner. This shift impacts the broader Sahel politics today.

A strategic emphasis on intelligence

Beyond large-scale troop deployment, AES authorities are prioritizing another form of cooperation: intelligence sharing and targeted, punctual operations along borders. For the Sahelian general staffs, intervention does not necessarily manifest as a highly visible, extensive deployment, but rather as coordinated actions within the tri-border area, where each army primarily operates from its own sovereign territory. This approach offers a more agile response to Sahel breaking news and security challenges.