JNIM’s evolving strategy in Mali: a war of attrition

Mali’s northern and central regions are no longer merely contending with sporadic armed assaults. For several years, these areas have been embroiled in a relentless conflict, leading to the sustained exhaustion of local populations. Recent offensives by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) against military outposts, convoys, and critical road infrastructure underscore a significant strategic shift.

These armed factions are moving beyond mere territorial conquest or the execution of high-profile operations. Their objective now appears to be the gradual destabilization of the territory, pushing it beyond the control of the military junta and confining its influence primarily to Bamako.

This strategic evolution is profoundly impactful because it redefines the core of the conflict. The central question is no longer who controls a specific town or military base. Instead, it becomes: who retains the ability to facilitate the movement of people, goods, fuel, administrative personnel, or essential public services?

A sustained campaign against mobility

For many months, attacks targeting crucial road networks and military convoys have escalated. In certain regions, administrative travel has become increasingly perilous, often requiring substantial armed escorts. This trend not only debilitates the Malian army but also erodes the state’s practical capacity to maintain a presence beyond major urban centers.

JNIM appears to have grasped a fundamental truth: in a state already weakened by years of institutional, economic, and security crises, a strategy of attrition can yield greater political dividends than direct, frontal engagements.

This approach is significantly less resource-intensive than conventional territorial conquest. It allows for the dispersal of opposing forces, inflates security expenditures, and fosters a pervasive sense of perpetual insecurity. Crucially, it cultivates a collective fatigue across military, economic, and social spheres.

In numerous rural areas, the primary concern is no longer just the presence of armed groups. It is the progressive erosion of any stable administrative horizon.

The limits of a purely military approach

Since successive coups, Mali’s military leadership has anchored its political legitimacy in the promise of restoring security. The departure of French forces and the subsequent expansion of Russian military cooperation were presented as a resurgence of national sovereignty.

However, sovereignty is not solely measured by the capacity to conduct military operations. It is equally defined by the ability to uphold territorial, economic, and administrative continuity.

Herein lies the Malian paradox: intensified military action does not necessarily translate into enduring stability. In some regions, it coexists with an accelerating fragmentation of rural spaces.

The prevailing security doctrine largely emphasizes offensive operations, airstrikes, and military deployments. Yet, it consistently struggles to re-establish a durable administrative presence, encompassing schools, healthcare, local justice, infrastructure, and economic circulation.

The resulting vacuum then generates its own dynamics. As public services diminish, local populations increasingly turn to parallel systems for protection, arbitration, or survival.

The Sahel: a crucible of armed reconfiguration

The situation in Mali now transcends its national borders. The entire Sahelian belt is witnessing a rapid reconfiguration of armed actors, local alliances, and clandestine economic networks.

The porous borders connecting Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger facilitate the swift movement of armed groups. In contrast, state responses remain largely national, even as insurgent dynamics operate on a regional scale. Significantly, these three nations, despite forming a political-military alliance, have proven unable to provide mutual support. The recent JNIM and FLA offensive underscored the fragility of this alliance and the isolation of the Malian military junta, whose sole external support comes from Africa Corps mercenaries.

This asymmetry favors groups capable of rapid adaptation. JNIM, in particular, leverages its territorial flexibility, its ability to establish local roots in specific areas, and its integration into informal economic networks.

This does not imply that JNIM maintains lasting control over all territories it traverses. However, it frequently succeeds in imposing a substantial security cost on states.

The Sahel conflict is thus evolving into a war of political endurance. Armed groups are less focused on fully administering a country than on persistently hindering the normal functioning of states.

Insights from the Malian crisis

The Malian crisis also exposes the limitations of a strictly counter-terrorism interpretation of the Sahel. Reducing the crisis to a simple military confrontation obscures the profound social, economic, and territorial dimensions of the conflict.

In many rural zones, frustrations stemming from state neglect, land disputes, communal rivalries, and structural poverty cultivate enduring vulnerabilities. Jihadist armed groups adeptly exploit these existing fractures. They do not always create them, but they are skilled at leveraging them.

The central challenge therefore becomes political: how to reconstruct state legitimacy in territories where the state often appears intermittently, primarily in a military guise?

This is likely where Mali’s future will be decided. Not in a singular decisive battle, but in the capacity—or incapacity—to rebuild a stable public presence that extends beyond mere security operations.

Indeed, a war of attrition does not merely dismantle military positions. It erodes roads, the economy, administrations, social bonds, and ultimately, the very concept of a governed territory.

Mourad Ighil