Mali’s five-year post-coup reality: a complex security and political landscape

Politique

Mali’s five-year post-coup reality: a complex security and political landscape

Five years have passed since Assimi Goïta seized power in Mali through a coup. This period has seen a surge of criticism directed at his administration, yet it also benefits from significant popular backing. We delve into an analysis of the current situation.

Portrait d'Assimi Goïta

This Sunday marks five years since General Assimi Goïta assumed control of Mali through a military coup. In the years that followed, numerous concerns have been raised regarding a worsening situation for the Malian populace, notably a decline in security and a shrinking space for freedom of expression and press freedom.

To gain further insight into these developments, I spoke with Ulf Laessing, who serves as the Sahel Program Director for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mali.

An interview with Ulf Laessing on Mali’s challenges

Ulf Laessing highlighted the tightening grip of repression. He noted that open discussion has become more challenging, even if candid conversations are still possible among trusted individuals. However, a palpable sense of caution now prevails. This constitutes a clear critique of the government. Furthermore, critical voices have been incarcerated, while others have been compelled to seek refuge abroad.

Portait d'Ulf Laessing, directeur du programme Sahel de la fondation Konrad Adenauer au Mali

What tangible improvements have the Malian people experienced since the military took power?

Ulf Laessing explained that initially, some areas saw a slight improvement in security. For a period, the road to Ségou remained open, and certain farmers were able to return to their fields. However, this is no longer the case. The crisis has persisted, and with substantial population growth, the impacts of climate change, and pervasive insecurity, I am quite pessimistic that any government can significantly alter the trajectory of the current situation.

Qui finance le JNIM et le FLA qui ont attaqué le Mali ?

In 2020, the military seized power with the stated aim of eradicating jihadists. This objective appears far from being met.

Ulf Laessing confirmed that the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State effectively control certain parts of the country. He believes no government, whether through another coup or a future elected administration, will succeed in reclaiming these territories. He remains largely pessimistic about the prospects of pacifying Mali.

Late April saw several coordinated attacks by jihadists and Tuareg rebels.

Indeed, that was a significant shock, Laessing stated. It marked the largest assault since 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadists briefly held control of the north before French forces intervened a year later. This was a direct challenge to the state’s authority. While the government has managed to stay in power, losing portions of the north, the rebels do not appear to be making further advances at this moment. Nevertheless, it represents a considerable loss of prestige. It was a dramatic attack that caught everyone off guard, especially given the presence of Russian forces, who were supposedly there to enhance security.

These Russian mercenaries, in principle, withdrew without significant engagement. Mali’s allies, Niger and Burkina Faso, members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), issued statements but provided no military aid. Mali found itself relatively isolated. How do you explain this?

Laessing explained that the Russian presence was often more for show than substance. With approximately 1,500 to 2,000 mercenaries on the ground, they fielded only a third of the French forces, who themselves struggled to pacify the entire country. The Russians’ brutal tactics have, if anything, exacerbated the conflict. Ultimately, their withdrawal from Kidal and two other northern locations without a fight was a humiliation. Little support was seen from Niger and Burkina Faso. They claimed air support, but in reality, Mali was largely on its own that day. This was unsurprising, as both Niger and Burkina Faso are grappling with their own jihadist threats. I don’t believe they possess the capacity to assist Mali, even if they wished to.

Des soldats du FLA dans une voiture, traversant une caserne antérieurement utilisée par l'Africa-Corps à Kidal

Is the solidarity often proclaimed by the three AES states less robust than generally perceived?

Politically, they are very close and share many aspirations, Laessing noted. However, they lack the political will and, critically, the capacity to implement these plans. While the three military leaders are united by ideology, they also preside over three of the world’s poorest nations. Therefore, a realistic assessment of this cooperation’s potential is essential. This is not the European Union building infrastructure together or NATO providing mutual defense. These are three extremely impoverished countries fighting for their very survival.

Assimi Goïta, Abdourahamane Tiani et Ibrahim Traore côte à côte

What potential solutions exist for Mali’s complex challenges?

A positive aspect, Laessing pointed out, is that the Malian people generally do not desire Sharia law or Islamist rule. This widespread sentiment could have fueled protests, despite the inherent dangers and repression. However, it is clear this is not what the population wants. He expressed hope that this foundation could eventually lead to genuine negotiations with the more moderate elements among the jihadist groups, opening a path for dialogue.

But what could be negotiated? Jihadists seek to control the country and impose Sharia law. How can one negotiate with such entities?

I don’t believe JNIM possesses the capability to control a major city like Bamako or the entire country, Laessing argued. Their objective is to be left undisturbed. They aim to control specific regions and coexist with others. In Bamako, they desire a government that might implement slightly more Sharia and engage in negotiations with them. Unlike in the Middle East, these jihadists are not foreign actors driven by a desire for violence. They are local individuals. Their grievances often revolve around access to water and land, which the jihadists exploit. At some point, I believe discussions will become inevitable. Military action is necessary, but so is dialogue with moderate figures. In Mali, there are already nascent pressures for such engagement.

Des personnes avec des bidons d'eau dans lac asséché de Faguibine dans la région du Tombouctou.

Mauritania faced a similar dilemma. There, the response combined military force with compromises. For example, alcohol is prohibited, and the country is designated an Islamic Republic. It’s true that a full Taliban-style program isn’t necessary. Perhaps a mutual understanding can be reached to satisfy the country’s needs. Once instability is mitigated, the state will naturally have greater freedom to act.

What are the aspirations of the Malian populace?

The people do not wish to live under Sharia law in Bamako, Laessing asserted. This was evident during the late April attacks: there were no widespread protests or strong demands for the government’s resignation. People understand that if the current government falls, the next one could be even more Islamist, which is not what they desire. Despite all the criticism leveled against the military government, it’s important to acknowledge that many still support it because they reject the alternatives: they don’t want jihadists, nor do they want the old, corrupt elites who were perceived as tied to France and Europe. Therefore, I believe that if no further major attacks occur, the government will likely remain in power, given this underlying support.

So, you don’t perceive the impression conveyed by social media as misleading, and that a significant portion of the population, particularly the youth, genuinely supports Assimi Goïta’s government?

The average age in Mali is 15 years old. Many are out of school and have no connection to Europe or France. They primarily get their information from social media, which is rife with propaganda, including disinformation spread by Russian actors to bolster the government. I believe there is still support for the current administration. The late April attacks would have been an opportune moment for protests, as the regime was weakened. This was also the case last autumn when fuel deliveries were disrupted. Yet, no one protested because the people clearly do not want to be governed by JNIM.

De la fumée sur les routes de Bamako

Perhaps they are simply too preoccupied with their daily survival, a situation now exacerbated by the blockade imposed on Bamako?

Life has certainly become significantly more challenging, even before these recent attacks, Laessing concluded. People have grown resigned; they’ve lost all illusions about politicians. It must also be said that political parties and the old guard of politicians have largely lost credibility, as many have held power before without bringing about improvements. This leads many to believe: let’s give those currently in power another chance.