France’s evolving stance on the acute crisis gripping Mali is becoming increasingly defined. Bruno Fuchs, a centrist (Modem) and President of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee, who frequently accompanies President Emmanuel Macron, recently shared his views without reservation. His candid remarks offer significant insight into French strategic thinking regarding the Sahel.

Beyond optimistic assertions about France’s future on the continent – suggesting that eliminating points of contention like the CFA franc and visa issues could restore France as a desired partner – the striking aspect of this discussion lies in its inherent contradiction. It promises a departure from the colonial ‘Françafrique’ relationship while simultaneously revealing a persistent drive to reclaim influence lost to Russian engagement in the region.

Perhaps the most provocative and unsettling comments concerned Mali itself. Fuchs, echoing sentiments likely shared by various French military and political strategists who may view the complex attack of April 25th with a certain satisfaction, presented a clear narrative: “The Russians are currently negotiating their withdrawal from Mali, and the ruling junta in Bamako will fall within weeks or months.”

Recalling President Macron’s statement in Nairobi – “the departure of French military personnel was undoubtedly not the best decision the putschists made for their country” – Fuchs was directly asked if France welcomed the military setbacks faced by Russians in northern Mali.

“removing the french partner was counter-productive”

Fuchs sidestepped a direct answer, instead paraphrasing the President: “Removing the French partner was counter-productive.” The implication for observers was clear. The deputy then continued with his forecast: “I believe the Malian junta has only days or weeks left. Today, it finds itself in a weak position relative to the FLA and JNIM. Therefore, a change in Mali’s regime is inevitable within weeks or months.”

The parliamentarian then ventured into particularly sensitive territory. He suggested Malians face a choice between “integrist jihadists” (JNIM) – a curious concept, as he noted, “not for everyone” (even more fascinating) – and the FLA rebels on one side, versus democratic life, public liberties, and the “life as before” in Mali on the other. “Life in Mali risks changing,” he insisted, seemingly overlooking the fourteen years of conflict already endured by the beleaguered population.

“how to integrate the jnim?“

With unwavering confidence, Bruno Fuchs then outlined Mali’s prospective political future. He presented two potential scenarios. In the first, Bamako agrees to negotiations. “If the junta and President Assimi Goïta are reasonable, they will open negotiations. There would be a transition period of three to six months with one of the Transition’s military leaders – I won’t name names, but not Assimi Goïta – leading to elections within three or six months.” Setting aside the unrealistic timeline, such a transition, initiated under JNIM pressure, would raise a critical question: “the question arises: within governance, within collaborative efforts, how do we integrate the JNIM?” This formulation warrants close attention: JNIM is an al-Qaida affiliate, and its leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, was France’s public enemy number one, with France losing 57 soldiers fighting this group in the Sahel.

Fuchs appeared to possess firsthand intelligence regarding JNIM, perhaps even more than any Malian. This was presented as a significant revelation.

“I believe JNIM is prepared to lay down its arms and cease armed struggle, provided it participates in the country’s political life. Not to seize control of Mali, but to engage in its political processes.” The Foreign Affairs Committee president did not explain why the most powerful actor on the ground would merely participate without asserting dominance. Perhaps, as is widely known, the important thing is not to win but to participate. This presents a cruel dilemma: “the question for us, as Europeans or French, is what do we do? Do we support this transition in which JNIM has a political role, or do we not? I don’t have the answer, but it’s a genuine matter of conscience and a significant political problem.” Indeed, it is a serious question, not just for “us, Europeans or French,” but primarily for the Malian people.

“the worst: afghanistan”

• Bruno Fuchs then unveiled a second scenario. “The junta insists on resisting, refuses dialogue, and eventually finds itself in a weakened position. The Russians are negotiating their departure, contrary to their public statements (…). At some point, the junta will fall. If it’s not negotiated, the outcome will certainly be worse than if negotiations had occurred.” Worse for whom? For Mali, the region, or France? Fuchs left this unstated. Returning to his first scenario, the deputy elaborated on the potential outcomes of the hoped-for negotiations.

“We could see a Mauritanian-style model, meaning a religious regime; or a Nigerian-style model, a federal state in Mali where some states apply Sharia law (…) and others do not. Essentially, a federal state with different regimes, guaranteeing representation and the role of each community in the country’s political life, similar to Nigeria.” This scenario finds favor with Bruno Fuchs: a not-too-extremist Islamic Republic where each community’s representation and role are guaranteed. How? He did not specify. A missed opportunity to advance the discussion. The core issue in Mali, after all, is that communities share the same space; they do not yet live in separate enclaves. This vision remains rather vague, even nebulous.

The second scenario, the “ultimate model,” is Afghanistan. While Fuchs seemed comfortable with the first, he stated he does not “wish for an Afghanistan in the heart of the Sahel, because that would have consequences for the entire region,” impacting not only the Sahel countries but also their “innocent” neighbors: Guinea, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, and Togo. “Complicated,” he concluded, an understatement given the gravity.

“russians reportedly ready to depart”

Slightly taken aback by these definitive pronouncements, the interviewer pressed further: “Do you have information indicating that the Russians are preparing to leave Bamako?”

“Yes, they are negotiating,” Bruno Fuchs replied without hesitation. “They have repositioned their forces. Negotiations are currently underway.” The uncertain outcome of these discussions, he noted, “depends entirely on JNIM, and on the junta.” However, he expressed certainty that the Russians “would be willing to withdraw, provided certain guarantees are secured for the assets they currently exploit in Mali, such as gold mines, for which they are reluctant to feel dispossessed, even if their legitimacy to exploit them is, in my opinion, quite questionable.”

Despite professing a desire to close the regrettable chapter of ‘Françafrique’ – with its “colonial-era behavior,” its “unresolved history with francophone Africa,” its tendency to impose “our truths and our views,” and its intolerance of “resistance” – Bruno Fuchs clearly holds firm opinions on who legitimately should exploit Mali’s resources.

The underlying message is that France, or perhaps “Europe, to avoid immodesty,” possesses greater legitimacy than Russia. Why? Because France is “reliable in its commitments,” unlike the Americans and Russians “who are currently leaving Mali because things are not going well for them.” Without pausing for contradiction, he then cited the example of the Central African Republic, with which “we have normalized our relations, re-established normal relations with President Faustin Archange Touadéra,” even though “the Russians are present there.” He concluded, “We must learn to work with everyone.”

With everyone, it seems, except the disfavored leaders of the Alliance of Sahel States.