Morocco HIV test shortage exposes public procurement failures with local manufacturers sidelined

There is something absurd about this situation. Public health facilities in Morocco have faced HIV rapid test stockouts for over a year in some cases, patients are turned away without screening, yet local producers have ready-to-deliver kits that could be dispatched within days of an order. The shortage, reported by multiple health professionals and patients, is not merely a logistical issue. It reveals a deeper dysfunction in public procurement within the health sector, where the legal preference for national products remains a dead letter.

Moroccan law is explicit on this point. Decree No. 2.22.431, which governs public procurement, includes a national preference mechanism. It stipulates that technical specifications in tenders must be based on performance and function, not on a specific brand, origin, or patent. Violating this principle is legally actionable, according to Abdelhay Rhorba, professor at Hassan II University of Casablanca and researcher in administrative law of public procurement.

“Inserting overly precise technical conditions or demanding certifications held only by a specific competitor violates the principle of equal opportunity,” he explains, “and can amount to abuse of power.” Moroccan administrative courts judge such situations based on a simple criterion: unjustified exclusion. In other words, if a tender document—even if formally correct—ends up excluding local producers, it can be challenged.

Recourse exists: a preliminary complaint to the National Commission for Public Procurement before the contract is awarded, followed by an appeal to administrative courts within 60 days. If corruption is suspected, Moroccan criminal law provisions on influence peddling can also be invoked.

But the key question is whether stakeholders have the resources to fight against the administration.

On the ground, industry players describe a blunt reality. The special specifications documents (CPS), which define tender requirements, are reportedly drafted based on foreign products already in use, perpetuating old contracts and ignoring new local manufacturing capacities.

A Moroccan medical device manufacturer, speaking on condition of anonymity, describes a Kafkaesque situation. His lab sells products in several African countries but holds less than 2% of the Moroccan public market in his segment. “The CPS should be based on Moroccan products—that is not happening today,” he says.

When an industry player asks the contracting authority for clarification that a tender is skewed toward a foreign product, the response is often silence or inaction. The public contract remains unchanged.

The contradiction extends beyond the Health Ministry. While the Finance Ministry recently increased customs duties on certain imported medical devices to encourage national production, the Health Ministry continues to buy more expensive imported products, ignoring cheaper local equivalents, according to sector sources.

The Ministry of Health’s Directorate for Drug and Health Product Supply offers its perspective. It states it operates “in strict compliance with the regulatory framework” and says tenders are “open to all operators meeting the requirements, with particular attention to operators established in Morocco.” However, a nuance emerges: the ministry clarifies that this requirement concerns the companies’ location, not the origin of product manufacturing. In other words, an importer based in Morocco is treated equally to a Moroccan manufacturer.

The case of HIV tests is particularly telling. According to information gathered, a stockout lasted over a year in some facilities. The ministry confirms in a written response that “temporary tensions have indeed been observed in some health structures,” attributing them to “delays related to public procurement procedures and disruptions in international supply chains.” Tenders are currently underway to secure supply, and “complementary alternatives” are being studied.

This explanation leaves many industry observers skeptical. If local producers have certified products in stock, why did shortages persist for months without emergency orders being placed with them?

On the issue of direct contracting, the ministry is categorical: “No recourse to direct contracting procedures was made in this context.” The 2025 acquisition procedures were reportedly conducted “exclusively through open tenders, in full compliance with regulations.” This directly contradicts information from multiple sources close to the matter. Without official documents made public, it is not possible to determine which version is accurate.

Direct contracting is only legal under limited conditions: unforeseeable extreme urgency, justified technical exclusivity, or failure of a tender. Decree No. 2.22.431 requires written justification and proof that no alternative exists, Abdelhay Rhorba notes. “Otherwise, using this procedure is considered illegal.”

Health sovereignty: a distant ideal

Behind the issue of public procurement lies the pressing question of Morocco’s health sovereignty. Professor Jaafar Heikel, a renowned infectious disease specialist, offers an important nuance: the lack of rapid tests does not mean a total inability to diagnose. Public and private labs can usually perform standard biological analyses. But rapid tests have value in their accessibility, speed, and ability to reach populations that do not visit conventional health facilities.

“NGOs like OPALS and ALCS play an extremely important role in HIV screening in Morocco,” he stresses. “They need these tests to reach people who might not go to a lab.” Interruptions in their supply have real consequences for field response.

On local production, Professor Heikel is clear: “When these locally manufactured tests are validated by state bodies, it is very beneficial for the country—first for financial reasons, and because it moves us toward health sovereignty.”

2030 goals at risk?

Morocco has committed to UNAIDS’ 95-95-95 targets: 95% of people living with HIV know their status, 95% of diagnosed individuals are on treatment, and 95% of those on treatment have undetectable viral loads. These aims are supposed to end AIDS as a public health threat by 2030. They rely precisely on widespread, rapid, and accessible screening.

“When there are no tests, fewer people get screened and the disease has more chance to spread,” summarized one manufacturer. Professor Heikel shares the assessment: “We will reach the 95-95-95 targets faster if we have rapid tests and validated national production.”

The Ministry of Health says it remains “fully mobilized to ensure continuity of screening services.” Industry players are waiting to see this mobilization reflected in actual practice and in the special specifications documents.

Today, sources are openly asking whether some members of the tender compliance and validation committees are acting to protect their own interests—or those of established foreign suppliers—in disregard of ministerial directives.

An investor who develops a validated product, responds to a tender, and is systematically excluded will not do so indefinitely. The risk is simple: discouraging investment in national production at a time when Morocco needs it most, and continuing to buy abroad what the country can manufacture itself.