Burkina Faso’s delicate path: navigating post-coup transition

The interpretation of what constitutes a coup d’état frequently shifts, often aligning with the perceived interests and whims of the international community, subsequently endorsed by neighboring states. In this context, the “appointment” of Transitional President Michel Kafando notably bypassed constitutional norms. Consequently, Burkina Faso is set to operate for at least twelve months under a framework of entirely newly established institutions.

Much like assembling a Lego set, the transitional governmental structures are gradually taking shape. Since the emergence of military uniforms onto the public stage, immediately following the hurried departure of the “Sphinx of Kosyam,” Ouagadougou appears to have regained a measure of calm.

Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, seemingly from obscurity, quickly dominated the political landscape, assuming all the prerogatives of a Head of State. What were his true intentions? How did he manage to integrate himself among the protestors and political party leaders? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, in an attempt to retain power, not a concerted decision between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré? Regardless, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) openly siding with the populace immediately sparked mistrust and considerable suspicion. The initial actions and directives issued by the military, such as the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly, fueled fears of an impending junta. It seemed the people, who had sacrificed and shed blood for their victory, were on the verge of being dispossessed.

As is often its custom, the African Union promptly threatened to ostracize Burkina Faso. Simultaneously, several ECOWAS heads of state – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – convened to engage with the military leadership, urging them to soften their stance. The precedents set by Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted the Burkinabe officers to reconsider their approach: firstly, seizing power by force is rarely unpunished; secondly, a protracted crisis resolution process risked isolating the nation and incurring widespread unpopularity.

Ultimately, the military negotiated a compromise solution, formalized within the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that the Executive branch would be led by a civilian Transitional President, while the military would maintain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transitional Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who spearheaded the struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising around twenty members, was tasked with the crucial responsibility of naming a Transitional President. This arrangement was a fixed-term contract (CDD), slated to conclude in November 2015, marking the end of Blaise Compaoré’s original mandate.

For the selection of the Head of State, each vital national stakeholder – including the army, civil society, opposition parties, and religious and traditional authorities – was required to submit a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five individuals were shortlisted:

The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, who edits the weekly L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ strong criticism of the former regime. The army adopted a broader strategy, diversifying its candidate profiles: an ecclesiastic, Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso; a diplomat, Michel Kafando; and a woman, former minister Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, the widely anticipated Archbishop of Bobo Dioulasso declared his disinterest in the role, preferring to focus on his current ministry.

The remaining two candidates held a distinct advantage over the others: their extensive experience within major international institutions. Ms. Joséphine Ouédraogo had served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his nation at the UN headquarters in New York, first between 1981 and 1982, and again from 1998 to 2011. In the Land of the Upright Man, an invisible divide separates society into those for or against Sankara. This implicit cleavage has profoundly influenced every political figure throughout their careers. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity from 1984 to 1987. Michel Kafando, conversely, was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Thomas Sankara’s government, during Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo’s presidency in 1982. Reportedly, the two men had disagreements regarding the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and held diametrically opposing ideologies.

A career within an international institution offers a dual benefit: an enhanced CV and an extensive network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.

For several months, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, will be compelled to set aside his cattle and chicken farming in Saponé for a greater cause: safeguarding the nation in peril! He will concurrently hold the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlines diplomatic channels, providing a single point of contact and effectively bypassing the head of government, Isaac Zida.

Burkina Faso’s evolving situation garnered close attention from various capitals: Accra, currently chairing ECOWAS; Addis Ababa for the African Union; and Paris and Washington for their geopolitical interests. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several Heads of State – from Mauritania (representing the AU), Ghana (representing ECOWAS), Togo, Benin, Mali, and Niger – traveled to Ouagadougou, a gesture aimed at rehabilitating Burkina Faso. Did this significant representation implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior? The United States typically adheres to a principle of non-cooperation with unelected heads of state, a situation currently applicable to Burkina Faso. Therefore, the international community orchestrated a façade to legitimize the coup and restore a semblance of constitutional order. This ensures that American reconnaissance planes can remain stationed in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as crucial bases for monitoring the Sahel region.

Out of 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four critical portfolios: the Prime Minister also holds the Defense ministry; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Security Minister in 2011, now oversees Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, was appointed to Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed duties at the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was given the post of Keeper of the Seals – a form of consolation prize – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who initially inherited the Ministry of Culture, had to resign days after his appointment due to pressure from civil society, which criticized him for having previously “closed” the Norbert Zongo case.

The National Transitional Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected one of the unsuccessful presidential candidates, Chériff Sy Moumina, as its president. He secured 71 out of 90 votes from his peers. The remaining task involves completing the institutional framework and mechanisms that will guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections, including establishing the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), drafting an electoral code, and enacting organic laws.

What are the objectives for this brief transitional period?

Since early December, Michel Kafando has signed the presidential decree establishing the National Reconciliation and Reforms Commission (CRNR). What is the scope of this body, and what is the duration of its mandate? More than 27 years after Thomas Sankara’s assassination, the Land of the Upright Man finally seeks to embark on a process of catharsis. Immediately after his designation, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida has also taken action, announcing that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would request the “extradition” of former President Blaise Compaoré from Morocco.

Through a series of public announcements, the current leadership has opened a Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases demand a considerable timeframe that will likely extend beyond the transitional period. Were these declarations made to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s primary focus. In this regard, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s special chief of staff and thus Isaac Zida’s direct superior – was dismissed from his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, essentially the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.

Will Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma remain loyal to General Gilbert Diendéré? Burkina Faso successfully defused the political crisis of October 30, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, with minimal disruption. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial clashes could have easily ignited a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to concentrate on organizing elections rather than implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by reopening the Sankara case?

How can a witch hunt be avoided? Two general directors of major national companies, considered close to the ousted president’s family, have already been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from the Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from the Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). While an act of contrition does not fully absolve past transgressions, it contributes to reconciliation; this was the recent approach of Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, a national tribute was paid to the seven individuals who fell victim to gunfire during the events of October 30 and 31. They now rest in the Gounghin cemetery.

Will the CRNR endure beyond the conclusion of the transition period? With all institutions now established, political figures and parties will soon take center stage. No prominent political figure chose to occupy a seat in either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively disqualifies them from standing in universal suffrage elections. Presidential candidates are already in the starting blocks. The formation of the CNT also prompted the self-dissolution of the CFOP, the opposition coalition. The electoral battle is certainly poised to commence at the very beginning of 2015.